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Abstract: Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant 
substitution effects. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to institutional 
constraints on workers’ labor supply choices or whether the behavioral assumptions of the 
standard life cycle model with time separable preferences are empirically invalid. We conducted 
a randomized field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose their working 
times and their efforts during working time. We document a large positive wage elasticity of 
overall labor supply and an even larger wage elasticity of labor hours, which implies that the 
wage elasticity of effort per hour is negative.  
While the standard life cycle model cannot explain the negative effort elasticity, we show that a 
modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods and a model with 
reference dependent, loss averse preferences are consistent with the evidence. With the help of a 
further experiment we can show that only loss averse individuals exhibit a significantly negative 
effort response to the wage increase and that the degree of loss aversion predicts the size of the 
negative effort response.  
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The intertemporal substitution of labor supply has far-reaching implications for the interpretation 
of important phenomena. If, for example, the intertemporal substitution of labor supply is high, 
one may interpret the large variations in employment during business cycles as voluntary choices 
by the workers rather than involuntary layoffs. Intertemporal substitution also plays a crucial role 
in the propagation of shocks across periods (Romer, 1996; King and Rebelo, 1999). Previous 
studies have found little evidence for intertemporal substitution of labor, however; the estimated 
elasticities are often small and statistically insignificant, and sometimes even negative (see, e.g., 
Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers 1985; Pencavel 1986; Altonji 1986; Blundell, 1994; Card 
1994 and Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).1 
However, the low estimates of intertemporal substitution are difficult to interpret because 
of serious limitations in the available data. The life cycle model of labor supply predicts 
intertemporal substitution with regard to transitory wage changes or wage changes the workers 
anticipate. Yet, the typical wage changes are not transitory; hence they are associated with 
significant income effects. In addition, it seems almost impossible to infer reliably from existing 
data whether the workers anticipated the wage change. Furthermore, serious endogeneity 
problems arise, as both supply and demand conditions determine wages.2 Thus, the typically 
available data require many auxiliary assumptions when testing the life cycle model of labor 
supply.  
Another issue arises if labor markets are characterized by a significant amount of job 
rationing or other constraints on workers’ labor supply. In fact, there is strong evidence 
suggesting that workers are not free to set their working hours (Ham 1982, Kahn and Lang 1991, 
Dickens and Lundberg 1993), rendering the identification of the source of small intertemporal 
substitution effects difficult, even if the above mentioned problems could be solved. A small 
intertemporal substitution effect could be due to these constraints or it could be that the 
behavioral assumptions behind the life cycle model are wrong. Indeed, Camerer, Loewenstein, 
Babcock and Thaler (1997) put forward the view that New York City cab drivers’ daily labor 
supply is driven by nonstandard, reference dependent, preferences that exhibit loss aversion 
                                                 
1 After reviewing a sizeable part of the literature, Card (1994) concludes, for instance, that the “very small magnitude 
of the estimated intertemporal substitution elasticities” can only account for a tiny fraction of the large person-
specific year-to-year changes in labor supply. 
2 Oettinger (1999) shows that if one neglects the endogeneity of wage changes, estimates of labor supply elasticities 
are severely downward-biased.  
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around a target income level. This view has recently been called into question by Farber (2004, 
2005).  
In this paper, we use an ideal data set to study workers’ responses to transitory wage 
changes. We conducted a randomized field experiment at a bicycle messenger service in Zürich, 
Switzerland. The bicycle messengers receive no base wage that is independent of effort, and are 
paid solely on commission. We have precise information for all the workers on the number of 
shifts they work, and the revenues they generate per shift. A shift always comprises five hours 
and workers in our sample worked at most one shift per day. A key feature of our experiment is 
the implementation of an exogenous and transitory increase in the commission rate by 25 percent. 
Therefore, we can be sure that unobserved supply or demand variations did not induce the change 
in the commission rate (i.e., the “wage” change). Each participant in the experiment knew ex-ante 
the precise duration and size of the wage increase. Since the wage was only increased during four 
weeks, its impact on the workers’ lifetime wealth is negligible.  
In the firm under study, the messengers can freely choose how many shifts (hours) they 
work, and how much effort they exert (to generate revenues). This means that our setting also 
provides an ideal environment for studying the behavioral foundations of labor supply: in our 
context, the absence of intertemporal substitution effects cannot be attributed to institutional 
constraints on labor supply. The exogenous change in the commission rate raises the returns from 
both the number of shifts and effort per shift. Therefore, we have the unique opportunity of 
studying how hours and effort respond to the wage increase and how overall labor supply (i.e., 
the number of hours times the effort per hour) is affected.  
Our experimental results show that the wage increase caused a large increase in overall 
labor supply. Our estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with regard to overall 
labor supply is between 1.12 and 1.25. This large effect is exclusively driven by the increase in 
the number of hours worked. In fact, the elasticity of hours worked with regard to the wage is 
even higher than the elasticity of overall labor supply; it lies between 1.34 and 1.50, considerably 
in excess of that found in previous studies (e.g., Oettinger 1999). The fact that the elasticity of 
hours worked is larger than the overall labor supply elasticity suggests that the effort per hour 
decreased in response to the wage increase. And indeed, a detailed analysis indicates that effort 
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per shift decreased by roughly 6% in response to the wage increase, which implies a wage 
elasticity of effort per shift of – 0.24.  
These results confirm the non-experimental evidence in previous studies of intertemporal 
labor substitution based on samples where workers were largely unconstrained in choosing hours 
and effort. Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) examined how cab drivers, after having 
decided to work on a given day, vary their daily working time (which is a good proxy for daily 
effort) in response to wage variations. Both studies report that workers work fewer hours (provide 
less effort) on high-wage days, indicating a negative effort elasticity. Oettinger (1999) 
investigated how stadium vendors adjust their probability of working in response to transitory 
wage variations across different baseball games. He develops a good set of ex-ante predictors of 
game attendance, which can be used to instrument for the wage: temperature, day of the week, 
the ranking of the home team, the quality of the opposing team, etc. In his IV estimates, Oettinger 
finds a positive and significant wage elasticity of participation, ranging from 0.53 to 0.64. The 
data in all these studies, however, do not allow making inferences on the overall labor supply 
elasticity: the data by Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) do not reflect the participation 
decision and Oettinger’s data do not allow reliable inferences about effort per game.  
When viewed through the lens of a standard neoclassical model with separable time 
preferences, the reduction in effort seems puzzling. After all, the rise in the commission rate 
provides strong economic incentives for working more hours and for working harder during those 
hours. Our results are, however, immune against the criticisms that have recently been raised 
against the study of Camerer et al. (Farber 2004, 2005). One problem is that the source of the 
variation behind cab drivers’ wages is not completely clear. If, for example, there are common 
supply side shocks (e.g. most drivers don’t work on the 4th of July), then the supply of cabdriver 
hours will be small on these days and the wage will be high. As a result, there will be a negative 
correlation between wages and hours that has nothing to do with loss averse preferences. This 
criticism does not apply to our study because we vary workers’ wages experimentally. A second 
concern is a possible selection effect: higher wages may induce cab drivers to work a few hours 
on days when they otherwise would not have worked. Such an effect may generate a negative 
correlation between daily wages and daily hours even though all individuals behave exactly as 
the standard model with time separable preferences predicts. Our data enable us to solve this 
problem as well.  
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In addition, we would like to point out that a reasonable extension of the standard model 
can, in principle, explain a negative effort elasticity. In the theory part of our paper, we show that 
a neoclassical model, in which last period’s effort raises this period’s marginal disutility of effort, 
is consistent with our evidence: workers who work in more periods may rationally decide to 
reduce effort per period. However, we also show that a rational choice model, with reference 
dependent preferences exhibiting loss aversion around the reference point, is also able to explain 
the evidence. The intuition behind this model is that workers with loss averse preferences have a 
daily reference income level.3 Daily incomes below the reference level are experienced as a 
“loss”, and the marginal utility of income is large in the loss domain. In contrast, the marginal 
utility of income at and above the reference level decreases discontinuously to a lower level. 
Workers who temporarily earn higher wages are more likely to exceed the reference income 
level, hence reducing their marginal utility of income and ultimately inducing them to provide 
less effort. At the same time, however, workers with higher wages have a higher overall utility 
from working a shift so that they can more easily cover the fixed costs of getting to work. Hence, 
they are more likely to work.  
There are thus two competing theories which are consistent with the facts. In order to 
discriminate between the two theories, we conducted another experiment based on the idea that 
loss aversion is a personality trait which affects behavior across several domains (Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; Gaechter, Hermann and Johnson 2005). In this experiment, we measured the 
individual worker’s loss aversion in lottery choices. We then used these measures to examine 
whether the negative response of effort per shift is due to the existence of loss averse workers. 
We indeed find that the degree of a worker’s loss aversion contributes significantly to the 
negative effort elasticity. Moreover, it turns out that workers who do not show loss aversion in 
the lottery choices also do not have a significantly negative elasticity. Only workers with loss 
aversion reduce effort per shift significantly when paid a high wage.  
Thus, the result of our second experiment favors the model with reference dependent 
preferences over the neoclassical model with “disutility spillovers” across periods. Of course, the 
evidence from the second experiment is not the ultimate arbitrator, but it suggests that future 
work should not disregard the loss aversion model because it could contribute to a deeper 
                                                 
3 Heath, Larrick and Wu (1999) provide evidence that goals often serve the function of a reference point.  
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understanding of effort choices. At the same time, we should also point out that one third of the 
workers in our sample did not exhibit loss aversion and a negative effort elasticity. Thus future 
work should take the possibility of heterogeneous preferences more seriously. In addition, the 
results of our first experiment unambiguously show that whatever behavioral forces worked 
against the intertemporal substitution of labor, they were apparently not capable of generating a 
negative elasticity of the overall labor supply. The behavioral forces that worked in favor of 
intertemporal substitution far outweighed any opposing forces.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the institutional 
environment and the details of the field experiment. Section II discusses the implications of 
different models of labor supply. Section III reports the results from the field experiment. We 
first report the impact of the wage increase on overall labor supply and then discuss how shifts 
responded; we finally present the evidence on how the wage increase affected the effort per shift. 
This section also describes the follow-up experiment and discusses the link between individual 
loss aversion and workers effort responses. Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
I. Experimental Set-up 
Our study is based on the delivery records of two relatively large Swiss messenger services – 
Veloblitz and Flash Delivery Services (henceforth “Flash”) – which are located in Zurich. Each 
firm employs between 50 and 60 bicycle messengers. The available records contain information 
about when a messenger worked a shift, all deliveries he conducted during a shift, and the price 
of each delivery. Thus, we know which messengers worked a shift and how much revenue they 
generated during the shift for each day in the observation period. We first describe the 
organization of work at a bicycle messenger service below and then present our experiment in 
more detail.  
 
A. Work at a Messenger Service 
Unless pointed out below explicitly, the arrangements are the same for the two messenger 
services, Veloblitz and Flash. When a potential worker applies for a job with one of the 
messenger services, an experienced messenger evaluates him or her with respect to fitness, 
knowledge of locations, names of streets, courtesy, and skills regarding handling the CB radio. 
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Once accepted as an employee, messengers can freely choose how many five-hour shifts they 
will work during a week. There are about 30 shifts available at Veloblitz, and about 22 at Flash 
on each workday from Monday to Friday. In principle, messengers could work more than one 
shift per day, but none of them chose to do so during the experiment and the months prior to the 
experiment. The shifts are displayed on a shift plan for every calendar week at the messenger 
service’s office. There are two types of shifts, called ''fixed'' and “variable”. A “variable” shift 
simply means that a shift is vacant at a particular time. Any messenger can sign up to work that 
shift, e.g., on Wednesday from 8 am to 1 pm. If a messenger commits to a ''fixed'' shift, he has to 
work that shift every week. For example, if a messenger chooses Wednesday, 8 am – 1 pm as a 
fixed shift, he will have to fill that shift on every Wednesday for at least six months. Thus, fixed 
shifts represent a commitment for several months and can only be cancelled with at least four 
weeks notice. Roughly two-thirds of the shifts are fixed. It is also import to note for our 
examination that the number and the allocation of fixed shifts across messengers remained the 
same during the whole experiment; the company refused to change the fixed shifts just because of 
the experiment. All shifts that are not fixed are variable shifts; they are available for any 
messenger to sign up for. All workers participating in our study worked both fixed and variable 
shifts.  
Two further items are worth mentioning. First, there is no minimum number of shifts that 
the messengers have to work at either messenger service. Second, both messenger services found 
filling the available shifts difficult. There is almost always at least one unfilled shift and, on 
average, almost 3 shifts per day remain unfilled. For example, during the period before the 
experiment, from September 1999 – August 2000, approximately 60 shifts remained unfilled 
every month. This implies that messengers are unlikely to be rationed in the choice of shifts.  
Messengers receive no fixed wage. Their earnings are given solely as a fixed percentage w 
of their daily revenues. Hence, if a messenger carries out deliveries that generate revenues r 
during his shift, his earnings on that day will be wr. An important feature of the work 
environment concerns the fact that messengers have substantial discretion on how much effort to 
provide during a shift. They only stay in contact with the dispatcher at the messenger service's 
office through CB radio. In order to allocate a delivery, say, from location A to location B, the 
dispatcher will contact the messenger whom he thinks is closest to A to pick up the delivery. All 
messengers can listen in on the radio. If they believe that they are closer to A than the messenger 
  
7
who was originally contacted, they can get back to the dispatcher and say so and will then be 
allocated to that delivery. Conversely, if the messenger does not want to carry out the delivery 
from A to B, he may just not respond to the call. Messengers have, therefore, several means of 
increasing the number of deliveries they complete. They can ride at higher speed, follow the radio 
more actively, or find the shortest possible ways to carry out a delivery.  
Thus, work at a bicycle messenger service closely approximates a model where individuals 
are unconstrained in choosing how many shifts (hours) to work, and how hard to work (i.e., how 
many deliveries to complete during a shift).  
 
B. The Experimental Design 
In order to evaluate the labor supply effect of a temporary wage increase, we randomly assigned 
those Veloblitz messengers who were willing to participate in the experiment to a treatment and a 
control group and we implemented a fully anticipated temporary increase in the commission rate 
by (roughly) 25% for the treatment group. The commission rate for men in the treatment group 
was temporarily increased from w = 0.39 to w = 0.49 and the rate for women was temporarily 
increased from w = 0.44 to w = 0.54. The additional earnings for the messengers were financed 
by the Swiss National Science Foundation.  
In order to participate in the experiment, all messengers had to complete a questionnaire at 
the beginning and at the end of each experimental period. The messengers were informed that a 
failure to complete all questionnaires meant that they would not receive the additional earnings 
from the experiment. All messengers who finished the first questionnaire also filled in the 
remaining questionnaires.4 Thus, the group of messengers who participated in the experiment was 
constant during the whole experiment, i.e., there was no attrition. Randomization into a treatment 
and a control group was achieved by randomly allocating the participating messengers into a 
group A and a group B. The randomization was based on the administrative codes that the 
messenger service uses to identify a messenger in its accounting system. All messengers at 
Veloblitz are assigned a number depending on the date when they started working for the 
company. The first messenger who worked at Veloblitz was assigned the number 1, the second 2, 
                                                 
4 The messengers at Veloblitz who did not participate in the experiment were almost exclusively workers who were 
already quite detached from the company or who where on probationary shifts. The “detached” workers typically 
worked roughly one shift per week during the experiment and the months prior to the experiment.  
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and so forth. The participating messengers with odd numbers were assigned to group A, 
participating messengers with even numbers to group B.  
The messengers did not know that the purpose of the experiment was the study of labor 
supply behavior, nor did they realize that we received the full (anonymous) records of each 
messenger about the number of shifts and the number of deliveries completed. If pressed, we told 
the participants that we wanted to study the relation between wages and job satisfaction. The 
purpose of our study was credible because the questionnaires contained several questions related 
to job satisfaction.5  
We implemented a 25 percent increase in the commission rate during four weeks in 
September 2000 for group A. The messengers in group B were paid their normal commission rate 
during this time period so that they can be used as a control group. In contrast, only the 
individuals in group B received a 25 percent increase in the commission rate during four weeks in 
November 2000, while the members of group A received their normal commission rate and 
therefore served as a control group. Thus, a key feature of our experiment is that there are two 
experimental periods that lasted for four weeks and that both group A and B served as a treatment 
and a control group in one of the two experimental periods. This characteristic of our experiment 
enables us to provide a very clean isolation of the impact of the temporary wage increase. If, for 
example, the implemented wage change increases labor supply, then we should observe this 
increase both in the first and the second experimental period. In the first experimental period, the 
members of group A (who receive the higher wage in this period) should exhibit a larger labor 
supply than the members of group B while the reverse should be true in the second experimental 
period – members of group B (who receive the higher wage in this period) should supply more 
labor. Moreover, since members of both groups are in the treatment and the control group we can 
identify the treatment effect within subjects by controlling for individual fixed effects.  
Our experimental design also enables us to control for the income effect of the wage 
increase, i.e. we can identify the pure substitution effect for the participating messengers. We 
announced the experiment in the last week of August 2000, and all additional earnings from the 
                                                 
5 These features of the experiment ensure that our results cannot be affected by the Hawthorne effect. The Hawthorne 
effect means that subjects behave differently just because they know that the experimenters observe their behavior. 
Yet, our subjects did not know that we could observe their behavior during the wage increase. Moreover, since both 
the treatment group and the control group are part of the overall experiment, and since our key results rely on the 
comparison between these groups we control for a potential Hawthorne effect.  
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experiment – regardless of whether subjects were members of group A or group B – were paid 
out after the end of the second experimental period in December 2000.6 Thus, the budget 
constraint for both groups of participating messengers was affected in the same way. Due to the 
randomization of the participating messengers into groups A and B, the income effect cancels out 
if we identify the treatment effect by comparing the labor supply of control and treatment group.  
As demand for delivery services varies from day to day and from month to month, it is 
useful to control for time effects. The available information about Flash enables us to identify 
possible time effects across treatment periods because both Veloblitz and Flash operate in the 
same market. There is a strong correlation between the total daily revenues at Veloblitz and 
Flash. When we compute the raw correlation between total revenues at the two firms over the two 
experimental periods plus the four weeks prior to the experiment, we find a correlation of 0.56 
(Breusch-Pagan χ2(1) = 18.93 , p < 0.01, N = 60 days). Even after removing daily effects from 
both series, the correlation is still 0.46 (Breusch-Pagan χ2(1) = 13.16 , p < 0.01, N = 60 days). 
This shows that the revenues at the two firms are highly correlated, even over quite short a time 
horizon.7 
We believe that our experiment represents a useful innovation to the existing literature for 
several reasons. First, it implements a fully anticipated, temporary and exogenous variation in the 
(output based) wage rates of the messengers, which is key for studying the intertemporal 
substitution of labor. The experimental wage increase was large and provides a clear incentive for 
increasing labor supply. Moreover, the participating messengers are experienced, and daily 
fluctuations in their earnings are common. Hence, we experimentally implement a wage change 
in an otherwise familiar environment. Second, the data we obtained from Veloblitz allows us to 
study two dimensions of labor supply: Hours as measured by the number of shifts and effort as 
measured by the revenues generated per shift or the number of deliveries per shift. No other study 
                                                 
6 In the time period between the announcement of the experiment and the beginning of the first treatment period no 
new regular workers arrived at Veloblitz. Only workers who worked on probationary shifts arrived during this time 
period and they were not allowed to participate in the experiment because they often leave the firm after a short time 
and lack the necessary skills. Including them in the experiment would have created the risk of attrition bias.  
7 If we add the 8 months prior to the experiment we find a correlation of about 0.75. To check the robustness of our 
results we also include – in some of our regressions – the non-participating messengers at Veloblitz in the non-
experimental comparison group that is used to identify time effects. 
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that we are aware of can look at these two dimensions simultaneously. Third, we can combine the 
data set with the full records from a second messenger service operating in the same market. This 
will prove useful for investigating any effect that the experiment might have had on the non-
participating messengers at Veloblitz, and helps to control for demand variations over time.  
 
II. Predictions  
In this subsection, we derive predictions about labor supply behavior in our experiment. We use 
two types of models –neoclassical models and a model of reference dependent utility with loss 
averse workers. In view of our results, we are particularly interested in the question of which kind 
of model is capable of predicting an increase in shifts (hours) worked and a decrease in effort per 
shift.   
 
A. Neoclassical Model with Time-Separable Utility 
In this subsection, we integrate the institutional setting at our messenger service into a canonical 
model of intertemporal utility maximization with time-separable utility. We define the relevant 
time period to be one day. Consider an individual who maximizes lifetime utility  
 Uo = ∑ =Tt 0 δ t u(ct,et,xt) (1) 
where δ < 1 denotes the discount factor, u( ) represents the one-period utility function, ct denotes 
consumption, et is effort in period t and xt denotes a variable that affects the preference for 
working on particular days. For example, a student who works a few shifts per week at Veloblitz 
may have higher opportunity costs for working on Fridays because he attends important lectures 
on Fridays. The utility function obeys uc > 0, ue < 0 and is strictly concave in ct and et. The 
lifetime budget constraint for the individual is given by 
 ∑ =Tt 0 tpˆ ct(1+r)-t = ∑ =Tt 0 ( twˆ et + yt) (1+r)-t (2) 
where tpˆ  denotes the price of the consumption good, twˆ  the period t wage per unit of et and yt 
non-labor income. For convenience we assume that the interest rate r is constant and that there is 
no uncertainty regarding the time path of prices and wages. The sign of the comparative static 
predictions is not affected by these simplifying assumptions.  
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In appendix A, we show that along the optimal path, the within-period decisions of a 
rational individual maximizing a time-separable concave utility function like (1), subject to 
constraint (2), can be equivalently represented in terms of the maximization of a static one-period 
utility function that is linear in income.8 This static utility function can be written as  
 v(et, xt) = λwtet – g(et,xt), (3) 
where g(et,xt) is strictly convex in et, and measures the discounted disutility of effort and xt 
captures exogenous shifts in the disutility of effort. λ measures the marginal utility of life-time 
wealth and wt represents the discounted wage in period t. Thus, λwtet can be interpreted as the 
discounted utility of income arising from effort in period t.9  
Workers who choose effort according to (3) respond to an anticipated temporary increase in 
wt with a higher effort et. A rise in wt increases the marginal utility returns of effort, λwt, which 
increases the effort level *te  that maximizes v(et, xt). The situation is, a bit more complicated in 
our experiment, however, because the messengers can choose the number of shifts and the effort 
during the shift. Theoretically the existence of shifts can be captured by the existence of a 
minimal effort level e~ that has to be met by the worker or by the existence of fixed costs of 
working a shift. Intuitively, if there is a fixed cost of working a shift, an employee will only work 
on a given day if the utility of *te , v(
*
te ,xt), is higher than the utility of not going to work at all. As 
a wage increase raises v( *te ,xt) workers are more likely to work on a given day, i.e., the number 
of shifts worked will increase. 10 
                                                 
8 Our characterization is inspired by the results in Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) who show that the within 
period decisions can be characterized in terms of the maximization of a static profit function. However, the present 
exposition is more convenient for our purposes.  
9 λ is constant along the optimal path of ct and et. This has the important consequence that an anticipated temporary 
wage variation does not affect the marginal utility of life-time wealth. Thus, anticipated temporary variations in 
wages (or prices) have no income effects. Yet, if there is a non-anticipated temporary increase in the wage, λ changes 
immediately after the new information about the wage increase becomes available and remains constant at this 
changed level afterwards. For our experiment, this means that the income effect stemming from the temporary wage 
increase has to occur immediately after the announcement of the experiment in August 2000. Thereafter, the 
marginal utility of life-time wealth again remains constant so that there are no further changes in λ during the 
experiment. The difference in behavior between the treatment group and the control group during the two treatments 
can thus not be due to changes in λ. Note also that (3) does not only describe the optimal effort choice in period t but 
is also based on the optimal consumption decision in period t. For any change in effort, the consumption decision 
also changes in an optimal manner (see appendix). 
10 More formally, the wage increase raises the utility of going to work for all x. Hence the participation condition will 
be met for more states x.  
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B. Neoclassical Model with Non-Separable Utility 
The prediction of the previous subsection is, however, not robust to the introduction of non-
separable utility functions. To illustrate this, consider a simple example where  
 v(et ,et−1) = λetw − g(et (1+αet−1)) . (4) 
 
This example captures the intuition that if a worker worked yesterday, he has higher marginal 
cost of effort today. We assume, for simplicity, that e0 = 0 , that there are only two further time 
periods, period 1 and period 2 and that the wage is constant across time. If we ignore discounting 
the two-period utility is given by U = 1( ,0)v e  + 2 1( , )v e e . Therefore, if the wage is high enough to 
induce the worker to go to work in both periods the worker chooses effort e1
**  and e2
**  according 
to  
 λw = g '(e1) +αe2g '(e2 (1+αe1))   (5) 
 λw = g '(e2 (1+αe1))(1+αe1) . (6) 
If work is supplied in both periods, an increase in e1 causes a higher disutility of labor in period 2 
which lowers e2. Of course, rational workers take this effect into account when they decide on e1 
which means that the overall marginal disutility of e1 is higher if e2 is positive compared to when 
it is zero. In particular, if wages are low enough so that it is no longer worthwhile to work in 
period 2 (e2 = 0), the first order conditions are given by  
 
 λw = g’(e1)  (5’) 
 λw < g’(0)(1 + αe1). (6’) 
A comparison of conditions (5) and (6) with conditions (5’) and (6’) shows that it is possible that 
the optimal effort e1 according to (5’) is higher than e1
**  and e2
** . In appendix B we provide an 
explicit example that proves this point. This possibility arises because the marginal disutility of 
working in each of the two periods, which is indicated by the right hand side of (5) and (6), is 
higher than the marginal disutility of working only in period 1 which is given by g’(e1). In the 
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context of our experiment, this means that messengers who work more shifts when the wage is 
high may rationally decide to reduce the effort per shift.  
The simple model above does not predict that workers who work more shifts (days) will 
necessarily reduce their effort per shift. It only allows for this possibility. If the wage increase is 
large enough, it is also possible that workers who behave according this model raise their effort 
per shift. There is, however, one prediction that follows unambiguously from a neoclassical 
approach regardless of whether utility is time separable or not. Browning, Deaton, and Irish 
(1985) have shown that a general neoclassical model predicts that overall labor supply et∑  
increases in the high wage periods in response to a temporary increase in wages. Applied to our 
context, this means that during the four-week period where the wage is higher for the treatment 
group, the total revenue (or the total number of deliveries) of the treatment group should exceed 
the total revenue (or the total number of deliveries) of the control group.  
 
C. Reference Dependent Utility 
Another potential explanation for why effort per shift might decrease in response to a temporary 
wage increase is that individuals could have preferences that include a daily income target y~  that 
serves as a reference point. The crucial element in this approach is that if a person falls short of 
his or her target, he or she is assumed to experience an additional psychological cost which is not 
present if income varies above the reference point. This explanation is suggested by the large 
number of studies indicating reference dependent behavior (for a selection of papers on this see 
Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Evidence from psychology (Heath, Larrick, and Wu, 1999) 
suggests that the marginal utility of a dollar below the target is strictly higher than the marginal 
utility of a dollar above the target.11 A daily income target seems plausible for bike messengers in 
our sample because their daily incomes are a salient feature of their work environment. The 
                                                 
11 See Goette and Huffman (2003) for survey evidence on this point. They present bike messengers with direct 
survey scenarios to elicit whether messengers care more about making money in the afternoon if they had good luck 
in the morning than after a bad morning. In their scenarios good luck means that messengers had the opportunity of 
making particularly profitable deliveries in the morning. For example, good luck means that a delivery just crosses 
an additional district boundary; such deliveries command a substantially higher price without much additional effort. 
About 70% of the messengers respond in a fashion consistent with daily income targeting.  
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messengers keep receipts from each delivery they did on a shift. This makes them acutely aware 
of how much money they earn from each completed delivery. The messengers also turn in the 
receipts at the end of the shift, making it difficult for them to keep track of how much money they 
earned over several shifts. A daily income target may also serve the messengers as a commitment 
device for the provision of effort during the shift. Zurich is rather hilly and riding up the hills 
several times during a shift requires quite some effort – in particular if the weather is bad or 
towards the end of a shift. A daily income target may thus help the messengers overcome a 
natural tendency to “shirk” that arises from a high marginal disutility of effort.  
Formally, the existence of reference dependent behavior can be captured by the following 
one-period utility function.  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) yewxegyew
yewxegyew
ev
tttttt
tttttt
t ~ if,~
~ if,~
<−−
≥−−= γλ
λ
 (7) 
where γ > 1 measures the degree of loss aversion, i.e., the increase in the marginal utility of 
income if the individual is below the income target. Previous evidence (see Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000) suggests that γ ≈ 2 for many individuals. Loss aversion at this level creates 
powerful incentives to exert more effort below the income target. However, once individuals 
attain the target y~ , the marginal utility of income drops discretely (from γλ to λ), causing a 
substantial reduction in the incentive to supply effort.  
The preferences described in (7) imply that workers increase the number of shifts when 
they are temporarily paid a higher wage: a rise in wages increases the utility of working on a 
given day. Thus, at higher wages it is more likely that the utility of working v(et) exceeds the 
fixed costs of working. At the same time, however, the increase in wages makes it more likely 
that the income target is already met or exceeded at relatively low levels of effort. Therefore, 
compared to the control group, the workers in the treatment group are more likely to face a 
situation where the marginal utility of income is λ instead of γλ, i.e., they face lower incentives to 
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work during the shift.12 As a consequence, members of the treatment group will provide less 
effort than members of the control group.  
The previous discussion shows that reference dependent preferences and a neoclassical 
model with non-separable preferences may make similar predictions. In particular, both models 
are consistent with a reduction in effort per shift during the wage increase. However, the 
reduction in effort in the income target model should be related to the degree of loss aversion γ , 
as explained above. Evidence suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of loss 
aversion between individuals, and that individuals who are loss averse in one type of decisions 
are also loss averse in other domains of life (see Gaechter, Herrmann, and Johnson, 2005). Thus, 
in principle, the two explanations can be distinguished if one obtains an individual level measure 
of γ . 
 
III. Results 
This section reports the results from our field experiment. Our analysis is based on the four weeks 
prior to the first experimental period and the two subsequent experimental periods in which first 
group A and then group B received a wage increase. The data contain the day of each delivery, 
the messenger’s identification number, and the price for each delivery. Thus, we have, in 
principle, two measures of labor supply – the amount of revenue generated and the number of 
deliveries completed. Since longer deliveries command a higher price and require more effort, the 
revenue is our preferred measure of labor supply. However, our estimates of the treatment effect 
are almost identical for either choice of the labor supply measure. 
 
A. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Total Revenue per Messenger 
The first important question is whether there is a treatment effect on total revenue per messenger 
during the first and the second experimental period. Figure 1a and 1b as well as Tables I and II 
                                                 
12 If γ is sufficiently high relative to the wage increase, one may obtain the extreme result that the worker provides 
effort to obtain exactly y~  before and after the increase. In this case, the worker’s effort obviously decreases in 
response to the wage increase because at higher wages y~  is obtained at lower effort levels. In general, the larger γ, 
the sharper the kink in the objective function and the more likely the worker’s optimal effort choice e* will be at the 
kink, i.e., the more likely γλ twˆ > g’(e*) > λ twˆ  holds. Note, however, that even if the worker is not a “perfect” 
income targeter, i.e., even if before or after the wage increase he does not earn exactly y~ , negative effort responses 
may occur.  
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present the relevant data. The figures depict the revenue data for groups A and B at Veloblitz; the 
tables show also the data of messengers at Flash and those messengers at Veloblitz who did not 
participate in the experiment. Figure 1a and Table I show the “raw” revenue per messenger – 
uncontrolled for individual fixed effects. Figure 1b and Table II control for individual fixed 
effects by showing how – on average – the messengers’ revenues deviate from their person-
specific mean revenues. Thus, a positive number here indicates a positive deviation from the 
person-specific mean, a negative number indicates a negative deviation.  
These figures and tables show that group A and B generate very similar revenues per 
messenger during the four weeks prior to the experiment. If we control for individual fixed 
effects, we find that the revenues per messenger are almost identical across groups and close to 
zero. For example, the difference in revenues between group A and B is only CHF 48.9 if we 
control for person specific effects with a standard error of CHF 366.6 (see Figure 1b and Table 
II). This difference is negligible in comparison to the average revenue of roughly CHF 3400 that 
was generated by a messenger during the pre-experimental period. Thus, in the absence of an 
experimental treatment the messengers in group A and B behave in the same way.  
However during the first experimental period (henceforth, “treatment period 1”), in which 
group A received the higher wage, the total revenue generated by group A is much larger than the 
revenue of group B, indicating a large treatment effect. On average, messengers in group A 
generated roughly CHF 4131 while messengers in group B only generated revenues of CHF 3006 
during this period (see Table I and Figure 1a). Then, in the second experimental period, this 
pattern is reversed and group B, which receives now the higher wage, generates much more 
revenue. In treatment period 2 group B generates revenues per messenger of CHF 3676 while 
group A only produces revenues of CHF 2734. If we control for individual fixed effects (see 
Figure 1b) we can see that the standard errors are relatively small, suggesting that the differences 
across groups are significant.  
 
Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here 
 
To control more tightly for statistical differences across groups, we performed regressions 
(1) – (4) in Table III. All regressions are of the form  
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 rit = αi + δTit + dt + eit  (8)  
 
where rit measures the revenue generated by messenger i during a four-week period t, αi  is a 
fixed effect for messenger i, Tit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the messenger is on the 
increased commission rate, dt  is a time dummy estimated for treatment period 1 and for 
treatment period 2, and eit  is the error term.  
Regression (1) is based only on the data of groups A and B at Veloblitz. Due to the random 
assignment of the participating messengers across groups and due to the fact that both groups 
served once as a control and once as a treatment group, this regression allows for a clean isolation 
of the treatment effect. The regression indicates that the treatment effect is highly significant and 
that the messengers on a high wage generate roughly CHF 1000 additional revenue compared to 
the experimental control group.  
The other three regressions show that the measured impact of the experimental wage 
increase on the treated group remains almost the same if we include in the comparison group 
messengers of Flash and non-participants of Veloblitz. Regression (2) compares the treatment 
group at Veloblitz with all other messengers at Veloblitz and finds again a large and significant 
treatment effect of roughly CHF 1000. Regression (3) uses observations from all messengers at 
Veloblitz and the messengers at Flash. The inclusion of the messengers at Flash is suggested by 
the strong correlation in revenues between Flash and Veloblitz. Regression (3) also includes a 
dummy for the whole non-treated group at Veloblitz, i.e. the messengers in the control group and 
those who did not participate in the experiment. Therefore, this dummy measures whether the 
non-treated group at Veloblitz behaved differently relative to the messengers at Flash and the 
treatment dummy measures whether the treated group at Veloblitz behaved differently relative to 
the messengers at Flash. In this regression, the coefficient of the treatment dummy indicates 
again a treatment effect of roughly CHF 1000. In addition, the dummy for the whole non-treated 
group at Veloblitz is small and insignificant, indicating that the non-treated group was not 
affected by the wage increase for the treated group. This result suggests that the wage increase for 
the treated group did not constrain the opportunities for working for the non-treated group at 
Veloblitz. The result is also consistent with the permanent existence of unfilled shifts and with 
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survey evidence; the overwhelming majority of the messengers stated that they could work the 
number of shifts they wanted to work. Finally, regression (4) uses the data from all Veloblitz and 
Flash messengers but does not include the dummy for the whole nontreated group at Veloblitz. 
Therefore, the treatment dummy in this regression measures whether the treated group at 
Veloblitz generates a different revenue from all the other messengers at Veloblitz and Flash. 
Again, the treatment effect is of similar size and significance as in the previous regressions.13  
In summary, the above results indicate a large and highly significant effect of a temporary 
wage increase on the total effort of the treated group. In contrast to many previous studies, our 
results imply a large intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The standard way to calculate this 
elasticity is to estimate (8) in logs. However, because some participants of the experiment did not 
work at all during a four-week period (because they went on vacation) we cannot use this 
method. If we did, we would have to drop these observations although the decision to not work 
during a whole four week period also represents a labor supply decision. For this reason we 
include all participating messengers in our measure and compare the percentage increase in the 
revenue per messenger (which is our proxy for overall labor supply per messenger) that is due to 
the wage increase with the 25% increase in wages. We have seen that the treatment effect is 
roughly CHF 1000. The average revenue across group A and B is CHF 3568 in treatment period 
1; in treatment period 2 it is 3205. Thus, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is between 
(1000/3568)/0.25 = 1.12 and (1000/3205)/0.25 = 1.25, which is substantially larger compared to 
what previous studies have found (see e.g. Oettinger 1999).14  
 
                                                 
13 It is also noteworthy that we find a negative effect of time on revenues per messenger in all four regressions. 
However, while the time effect is never significant for the first treatment period, it is higher for the second treatment 
period and reaches significance at the 5% level in some of the regressions. These time effects suggest that a 
comparison of the revenues of the same group over time is problematic because revenue is likely to be “polluted” by 
monthly variations in demand. It is thus not possible to identify the treatment effect by comparing how a group 
behaved in treatment period 1 relative to treatment period 2.  
14 It is even possible that our measure of the elasticity of labor supply with regard to a temporary wage increase 
underestimates the true elasticity because we use revenues per messenger as a proxy for labor supply per messenger. 
If wages w affect effort e and effort affects revenue r the elasticity of e with respect to w, which we denote by εew, is 
given by εrw/εre where εrw is the elasticity of r with respect to w (which is observable to us) and εre is the elasticity of 
r with respect to e (which is not observable to us). Thus, our measure εrw implicitly assumes that the elasticity εre is 
equal to one. If εre is less than one our measure even underestimates the true labor supply elasticity. εre is less than 
one if the production function r = f(e) is strictly concave and f(0) = 0 holds.  
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B. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Shifts worked 
After we documented the strong impact of the wage increase on total labor supply, the natural 
question is whether both the number of shifts and the effort per shift increased. In this section we 
examine, therefore, the impact of the wage increase on the number of shifts worked while in the 
next section we have a closer look at effort per shift. Figure 2a and 2b provide a first indication of 
how the wage increase affected shifts. Figure 2a shows the absolute number of shifts per worker 
in group A and B during the four-week period prior to the experiment and the two treatment 
periods. Figure 2b controls for person specific effects by showing the average deviation of the 
number of shifts from the person specific means.  
Figure 2a shows that group A worked roughly 12 shifts in the pre-experimental period and 
group B worked roughly 11 shifts (see also Table I for the precise numbers). However, the 
standard errors are very large due to large differences between the workers, suggesting 
insignificant differences across groups. If we control for person specific effects (see Figure 2b) 
we find that the average deviation from person specific means is very small in both groups and 
close to zero during the pre-experimental period. Table IV, which shows the concrete numbers 
relating to Figure 2b, indicates that in group A the deviation from person specific means is 0.22 
(with a standard error of 1.29) and in group B it is -0.35 (with a standard error of 0.98). Thus, 
there are almost no differences in shifts across groups before the experiment. 
During the first treatment period, however, the messengers in group A, who are paid the 
high wage, worked almost 4 shifts more than did the messengers in group B. Likewise, in the 
second treatment period the messengers in group B, who receive now the high wage, work 
substantially more shifts than the messengers in group B. Moreover, if we control for person 
specific effects (see Figure 2b and Table IV), the standard errors become very small, suggesting 
that the differences across groups are significant.  
 
Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here 
 
To test more rigorously for significant differences, we performed regressions (5) – (8) in 
Table III. The independent variable in these regressions is sit, the number of shifts that messenger 
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i worked during the four week period t. The right hand side of these regressions is the same as in 
equation (8), i.e., we included a treatment dummy, individual fixed effects and time dummies for 
treatment periods 1 and 2. Regression (5) estimates the impact of the treatment by using only data 
from group A and group B. It shows a large and highly significant treatment effect; the treated 
group works on average four shifts more than the control group. Regression (6) uses data from all 
messengers at Veloblitz; the treatment dummy thus compares the treated with the whole group of 
untreated messengers at Veloblitz. This regression basically replicates the results of regression 
(5). In regression (7), we use data from all messengers at Veloblitz and at Flash. In addition, we 
include a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a messenger belongs to the whole non-
treated group at Veloblitz (which comprises the experimental control group and the messengers 
who did not participate in the experiment). As in regression (3), this dummy measures whether 
the experiment had an effect on the whole non-treated group at Veloblitz by comparing this group 
with Flash messengers. The coefficient of this dummy is highly insignificant, suggesting that the 
experiment had no effect on the non-treated group at Veloblitz. The treatment dummy in 
regression (7) compares the treated group with the Flash messengers and again indicates a 
significant treatment effect of similar size as in the previous regressions. Finally, regression (8) 
compares the treated group to all untreated messengers at Veloblitz and Flash; again the 
treatment effect is roughly 4 shifts per treatment period and significant.  
In summary, Figure 2a and 2b, Table IV, and regression (5) – (8) indicate a clear positive 
treatment effect of the wage increase on shifts. On average, workers supplied about four shifts 
more if they receive a high commission rate. Since the average number of shifts worked during 
the two treatment periods is 11.925 and 10.64, respectively, the wage elasticity of shifts is 
between (4/11.925)/0.25 = 1.34 and (4/10.64)/0.25 = 1.50. Thus, the shift choices are even more 
responsive to the wage increase than total revenue per messenger. By definition, the wage 
elasticity of total revenue is equal to the elasticity of shifts plus the elasticity of the revenue per 
shift. Therefore, the higher wage elasticity of shifts compared to the elasticity of total revenues is 
a first indication that the elasticity of effort per shift is negative.  
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C. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Effort per Shift 
When examining the revenue per shift, it is useful to restrict attention to behavior during fixed 
shifts. Recall that the management at Veloblitz did not allow workers to change their fixed shifts 
after the announcement of the experiment and during the experiment. The increase in the supply 
of shifts is fully borne by the variable shifts. Therefore, our experiment could not induce any kind 
of selection effect with regard to the fixed shifts and the revenue change during the fixed shifts 
identifies the impact of the treatment on effort per shift. 15 
In Figure 3a, we show the log of revenue per shift in group A and B during the four weeks 
prior to the experiment and in the two treatment periods. We control for person effects in Figure 
3b by showing the deviation from person-specific means. If we control for person-specific 
effects, we find that both groups generated almost identical revenues per shift during the four 
weeks prior to the experiment. However, group B, which receives the lower wage, generates 
roughly 5 percent more revenue per shift than group A during the first treatment period. 
Likewise, in the second treatment period, group A, which receives now the lower wage, exhibits 
roughly a  6 percent higher revenue per shift than group B. Thus, Figures 3 suggests that the 
wage increase caused a reduction in revenue per shift.  
 
Insert Figure 3a and 3b about here 
 
The impression conveyed by Figures 3 is further supported by the two regressions presented 
in Table V, which are based on observations from group A and B during fixed shifts. The 
dependent variable is log revenue of messenger i at day t. We include a treatment dummy in both 
regressions that takes on a value of 1 if messenger i at day t is in the treatment group and we 
further control for daily fixed effects and i’s tenure. Daily fixed effects are important because of 
demand variations across days; tenure is important because experienced messengers usually have 
higher productivity. We do not control for individual fixed effects in regression (1), but for a 
messenger’s gender. This regression shows that the wage increase leads to a reduction in revenue 
per shift by roughly 6 percent. We control for individual fixed effects in regression (2). The 
                                                 
15 We should, however, mention that the results remain the same when we examine revenue per shift over all (fixed 
and variable) shifts.  
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treatment effect in this regression is again significantly negative and indicates a reduction in 
revenues by roughly 6 percent.  
Thus, the temporary wage increase indeed reduced revenue per shift. The implied wage 
elasticity of revenue per shift is – 0.06/0.25 = – 0.24, which is consistent with our neoclassical 
model with preference spillovers across periods and the target income model based on loss 
aversion. It is also worthwhile to point out that this estimate neatly fills the gap between the 
elasticity of total revenue and the elasticity of shifts. The intermediate value (between the lower 
and the upper bound) of the elasticity of total revenue is 1.18; the intermediate value for the 
elasticity of shifts is 1.42. Thus, according to this difference the elasticity of effort per shift 
should be – 0.24. Our estimates in Table V precisely match this value.  
 
D. Does Loss Aversion Explain the Negative Impact on Effort per Shift? 
We provide additional evidence in this section that helps us understand the forces behind the 
negative impact of the wage increase on effort per shift. Our strategy is to measure individual 
level loss aversion and to examine whether these measures have predictive value with regard to 
individuals’ response of effort per shift. In other words, we ask the question whether the loss 
averse messengers drive the negative effect of the wage increase on effort per shift or whether the 
messengers who are not loss averse drive this effect? If mainly the loss averse messengers show a 
negative effort response, the loss aversion model is supported; if the negative effect on effort is 
not related to individual’s loss aversion, the neoclassical model provides the more plausible 
explanation.  
Loss aversion and reference dependent behavior have implications in a variety of domains. 
Loss averse choices have been documented, in particular, in the realm of decision-making under 
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Therefore, we measured the messengers’ loss 
aversion by observing choices under uncertainty in an experiment that took place eight months 
after the experimental wage increase. As part of this study, we presented the messengers with the 
opportunity to participate in the following two lotteries: 
 
Lottery A: Win CHF 8 with probability 1/2, lose CHF 5 with probability 1/2. If subjects reject 
lottery A they receive CHF 0.  
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Lottery B: This lottery consists of six independent repetitions of Lottery A. If subjects reject 
lottery B they receive CHF 0.  
 
Subjects could participate in both lotteries, or only in one lottery, or they could reject both 
lotteries.  
The above lotteries enable us to construct individual measures of loss aversion. In 
particular, the observed behavior in these lotteries enables us to classify subjects with regard to 
their degree of loss aversion γ. If subjects’ preferences are given by (7), subjects who reject 
lottery A have a higher level of γ  than subjects who accept lottery A and subjects who reject 
lottery A and B have a higher level of γ  than subjects who reject only lottery A. In addition, if 
subjects’ loss aversion is consistent across the two lotteries, then any individual who rejects 
lottery B should also reject lottery A because a rejection of lottery B implies a higher level of loss 
aversion than a rejection of only lottery A. We derive these implications of (7) explicitly in 
appendix C. 
Among the 42 messengers who belong either to group A or B, 19 messengers rejected both 
lotteries, 8 messengers rejected only lottery A, 1 messenger rejected only lottery B and 14 
messengers accepted both lotteries. Thus, with the exception of the one messenger who rejects 
only lottery B, all messengers who rejected lottery B also rejected lottery A. These results can be 
neatly captured by a simple loss averse utility function that obeys equation (7).16 
In principle, one might think that the rejection of A and/or B is also compatible with risk 
aversion arising from diminishing marginal utility of lifetime income. Rabin’s calibration 
theorem (Rabin 2000) rules out this interpretation, however. Rabin showed that a theory of risk 
averse behavior based on the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of life-time income 
implies that people essentially must be risk neutral for low stake gambles like our lotteries. 
Intuitively, this follows from the fact that risk averse behavior for low stake gambles implies 
ridiculously high levels of risk aversion for slightly higher, but still moderate, stake levels. Yet, 
such unreasonably high levels of risk aversion can be safely ruled out. For example, we show in 
appendix D that if one assumes that the rejection of lottery A is driven by diminishing marginal 
utility of life time income, then the subject will also reject a lottery where one can lose $32 with 
                                                 
16 These results are qualitatively similar to the results obtained in a many other studies (e.g., Read, Loewenstein, and 
Rabin, 1999; Cubbit, Starmer and Sudgen, 1998; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992; Keren and Wagenaar, 1987). 
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probability ½ and win any positive prize with probability ½. Thus, there is no finite prize that 
induces this subject to accept a 50 percent chance of loosing $32. Similar results are implied by a 
rejection of lottery B.  
We illustrate the behavior of messengers with and without loss averse preferences in Figure 
4. The figure controls for person specific effects by comparing individual log revenues to the 
mean of the individual’s log revenues. We show that the messengers who did not display loss 
averse preferences do not change their effort per shift across the treatment and the control period. 
However, the messengers who displayed loss aversion in the lottery choices exhibit a lower effort 
per shift in the treatment period compared to the control period. This pattern suggests that the 
negative effect of wages on effort per shift may only be driven by the loss averse messengers. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
To examine this possibility in more depth, we conducted the regressions in Table VI. In 
these regressions, log daily revenue of messenger i at day t is again the dependent variable and 
we control for the messengers’ tenure and for daily fixed effects in all four regressions. In the 
first two regressions, we generate a loss aversion dummy L that is based on the rejection of 
lottery A. If a messenger rejects this lottery L = 1, if lottery A is accepted L = 0. In regression (1) 
and (2) we estimate the treatment effect for the loss averse messengers (by interacting the 
treatment dummy with L) and for the messengers who did not exhibit loss aversion (by 
interacting the treatment dummy with (1-L)). Regression (1), which does not control for 
individual fixed effects, shows that loss averse messengers generated a roughly 10 percent lower 
revenue per shift when they received the high wage. In contrast, the treatment effect is much 
lower and insignificant for the messengers without loss aversion. Regression (2), which controls 
for individual fixed effects, shows the same pattern. There is no significant decrease in revenue 
per shift for messengers without loss aversion, whereas the messengers with loss aversion exhibit 
a significant 10 percent reduction in revenue per shift during the treatment period.  
Regressions (3) and (4) provide a further robustness check for these results. We use a finer 
scale to indicate a messenger’s loss aversion in these regressions. Here, we capture the absence of 
loss aversion, which is indicated by the acceptance of both lotteries, by L’ = 0. If a messenger 
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rejects only one of the lotteries we assign L’ = 1 and if both lotteries are rejected we assign L’ = 2 
to this messenger. The variable “treatment dummy × loss averse” is now defined as the 
interaction between the treatment dummy and L’. Thus, the interaction term measures how the 
degree of loss aversion affects the messengers’ effort responses, whereas the treatment dummy 
alone measures the effort response of those who did not display loss aversion.17 Both regression 
(3) and (4) indicate that the messengers without loss aversion did not show a significant effort 
reduction in response to the wage increase. In contrast, the interaction term is relatively large and 
significant; an increase in L’ by one integer unit decreases revenue per shift by roughly 8 
percentage points. Thus, messengers who rejected both lotteries generated a 16 percentage point 
lower revenue per shift when they received the high wage. This result suggests that the negative 
impact of the wage increase on revenue per shift is associated with the messengers’ degree of loss 
aversion which lends support to the target income model discussed in Section II.C. 
 
V. Summary  
This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment examining how workers, who can 
freely choose their working time and their effort during working time, respond to a fully 
anticipated temporary wage increase. We find a strong positive impact of the wage increase on 
total labor supply during the two four-week periods in which the experiment took place. The 
associated intertemporal elasticity of substitution is between 1.12 and 1.25. The large increase in 
total labor supply is exclusively driven by the increase in the number of shifts worked. On 
average, messengers increase their working time during the four weeks in which they receive a 
higher wage by four shifts (20 hours), which implies a wage elasticity of shifts between 1.34 and 
1.50. This is a considerably larger elasticity than what has previously been found on the basis of 
daily labor supply data (Camerer et al. 1997, Chou 2000, Oettinger 1999). We also find that the 
wage increase causes a decrease in revenue (effort) per shift by roughly 6 percent. However, the 
increase in the number of shifts dominates the negative impact on effort per shift by a large 
margin such that overall labor supply strongly increases.  
                                                 
17 Thus, in regressions (1) and (2), the variable “treatment dummy × not loss averse” is constructed as “treatment 
dummy × (1 – L) whereas the variable “treatment dummy × not loss averse” is given by the treatment dummy alone 
in regressions (3) and (4). But the variable “treatment dummy × not loss averse” measures the effort response of the 
messengers who did not display loss aversion in the lotteries in all four regressions.  
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The standard neoclassical model with separable intertemporal utility is not consistent with 
the evidence because this model predicts that both the number of shifts and the effort per shift 
increase in response to the wage increase. However, we show that a neoclassical model with 
preference spillovers across periods as well as a target income model with loss averse preferences 
is consistent with the observed decrease in effort per shift. In order to discriminate between these 
two models, we measured the messengers’ loss aversion at the individual level in the domain of 
choices under uncertainty. We use these measures to examine whether the negative impact of the 
wage increase on effort per shift is mediated by the degree to which messengers’ are loss averse. 
We find that the degree of loss aversion is indeed related to the response of effort per shift: higher 
degrees of loss aversion are associated with a stronger negative impact of the wage increase on 
effort per shift and workers who do not display loss aversion in choices under uncertainty also do 
not show a significant effort reduction. Thus, it seems that loss aversion drives the negative effect 
of wages on effort.  
We believe that these results contribute to a deeper understanding of the behavioral 
foundations of labor supply. Our results certainly do not rule out a role for “neoclassical” 
preferences in labor supply decisions. One third of the workers in our sample did not exhibit loss 
aversion and the large intertemporal substitution effects on overall labor supply and the supply of 
shifts document the power of behavioral forces that have always been emphasized in the standard 
life cycle model. Our results also contrast sharply with the small and insignificant substitution 
effects that have been found in many previous studies. Therefore, the small effects in these 
studies may reflect the constraints workers face in their labor supply decisions and – in view of 
our results – may be less likely due to workers’ unwillingness to substitute labor hours over time. 
However, our results on the behavioral sources of the negative wage elasticity of effort per shift 
also suggest that disregarding reference dependent preferences in effort decisions is not wise.  
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Appendix A 
 
In this appendix, we derive the quasi linear objective function in equation (3) of the paper from 
the underlying intertemporal maximization problem. The intertemporal optimization problem is  
1ˆ ˆmax ( , ; )  subject to ( )(1 ) 0t t t t t t t t tU u c e x w e y p c rδ −= + − + =∑ ∑  
where u is strictly concave and twice differentiable in e and c, e is labor supply in period t, c is 
consumption in period t, x is a taste shift variable to allow for periods without work, ˆ tw  is the 
wage, ˆ tp  is the price of consumption goods, δ is the discount rate, and r is the interest rate. We 
assume that there are no liquidity constraints, and that the path of wages, prices, and the taste 
shifter are known, and that the interest rate is constant. 
The first order conditions to this problem are 
ˆ( , , ) (1 )t tc t t t tu c e x r pδ λ−= +  
ˆ( , , ) (1 )t te t t t tu c e x r wδ λ−− = +  
where λ  is the Langrange multiplier on the life-time budget constraint. Thus, it can be 
interpreted as the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. Define the discounted price as 
ˆ(1 ) t tt tp r pδ− −= +  and the discounted wage wt analogously. The first order conditions then have 
the easily interpretable form 
( , , )c t t t tu c e x pλ=  (A1) 
( , ; )e t t t tu c e x wλ− =  (A2) 
Equation (A1) implies that, at every date t, the individual equates the marginal utility of 
consumption to the marginal utility of lifetime income λ  times the discounted price of the 
consumption good. Similarly, when choosing how hard to work, the individual chooses effort 
such that the marginal disutility of effort is equal to the marginal utility of lifetime income times 
the discounted wage per unit of effort tw . The model also allows for non-participation. If 
( ,0, )e t t tu c x wλ− < it is optimal to choose e = 0.  
It is possible to represent within-period preferences in terms of a static objective function. 
This is essentially a reformulation of the results in Browing, Deaton, and Irish (1985). Consider 
  
equation (A1) again. Since u(.) is strictly concave, uc is strictly decreasing in c. Thus, (A1) can be 
solved for ct
 
1( , , )t c t t tc u p e xλ−=  (A3) 
Substitute this into (A2) to obtain 
1( ( , , ), , )e c t t t t t tu u p e x e x wλ λ−− =  (A4) 
Now consider the static one-period objective function 
( ) ( , , )t t t t t tv e w e g e p xλ λ= −  (A5) 
where λ is the lifetime marginal utility of income along the optimal path. Next we show that 
maximizing this static objective function is equivalent to solving the intertemporal maximization 
problem, that g( ) is convex and can be interpreted as the monetary equivalent of the disutility of 
effort. To see that this, define 
1
0
( , , ) ( ( , , ), , )t
e
t t t e c t t t t tg e p x u u p e x e x dxλ λ−= −∫  (A6) 
From the construction of g( ) in (A6), it is obvious that the first order condition (FOC) that results 
from the static one-period objective function is equivalent to the FOC (A4). To show that g( ) is 
convex in e, we need to show that the second derivative w.r.t. e is positive. We proceed in two 
steps: First, consider how the individual adjusts consumption to a small perturbation in labor 
supply along the optimal path, i.e., λ remains constant. Differentiation of (A1) yields:  
 
dct
det
= − uce
ucc . 
Now, take the second derivative of g( ) to obtain 
( )2 21( , , ) t ceee t t t ee ce ee cc ee ce
t cc cc
dc ug e p x u u u u u u
de u u
λ −= − − = − + = −
 
To determine the signs of the terms, observe that the conditions for concavity of u( ) are ucc < 0, 
uee < 0 and uccuee – 2ceu  > 0. But this establishes the convexity of g( ), as claimed. Thus, in the 
canonical life-cycle model, a rational, forward looking individual behaves as if she maximized 
the one-period objective function (A5). 
 
  
Appendix B 
In this appendix, we provide a specific example that shows how non-separable time preferences 
can induce workers to increase the number of shifts but decrease the effort per shift in response to 
a wage increase. We consider a two-period model in which the workers one-period objective 
function is given by  
1 1( , ) ( , )t t t t tv e e we g e eλ− −= − . 
We assume that if a worker does not work during a period she has a utility from leisure time of L0 
and that the effort cost function g( ) is given by 
 g(et ,et−1) = et (1+αet−1) + 0.5get2 . 
If we ignore discounting and set e0 = 0, total utility is given by 
1 2 1( ,0) ( , )U v e v e e= + . 
(a) If an individual works only one period, the first order condition for effort in this period is 
 
∂U
∂et
= λw −1− get = 0 ⇔ et*(w) = λw −1g . 
Substituting this into the utility function, we get the overall utility of working one shift 
 
U (one shift) = λw −1( )2
2g
+ L0 . 
(b) If an individual works two shifts, the first order conditions for effort in the two periods are 
given by 
 
∂U
∂e1
= λw −1− ge1 −αe2 = 0
∂U
∂e2
= λw −1− ge2 −αe1 = 0
 
The two first order conditions imply  e1 = e2 . Therefore,  
 
e1
**(w) = e2**(w) = λw −1g +α . 
Substituting this into the objective function, we get  
 
U (two shifts) = λw −1( )2
g +α  
  
We can now examine the implications of this model for the number of shifts worked and effort 
exerted on a shift as a function of the wage w.  
 
(i) Shifts: A rational individual works two shifts if U (two shifts) >U (one shift) . This implies 
 
λw −1( )2
g +α >
λw −1( )2
2g
+ L0  (B1) 
Notice that, in this model, if  α > g , it is never optimal to work two shifts. The condition α > g  
has a straightforward interpretation: In this case, yesterday's effort raises today's marginal costs of 
effort by more than today's effort raises today's marginal costs of effort. Simplifying this 
inequality, we get 
 
λw −1> L0 2g(g +α )g −α . (B2) 
Denote the wage that satisfies (B2) with equality by w ' . As intuition suggests, the individual's 
participation is increasing in the wage: If w is large enough such that (B2) is satisfied, she will 
work two shifts.  
(ii) Effort: To examine how effort responds to a change in wages, we choose two wage levels 
 wL < wH and set  wL = w ' , i.e. the low wage is equal to the highest wage at which it is still 
optimal to work only one shift. If the wage is low, the individual works one shift, and effort is 
equal to  
0
*
1 0
2 ( )
1 2( )( )
( )L
g gL
gw ge w L
g g g g
α
αλ α
α
+
−− += = = −  
Effort on the high wage is equal to  
 
e1
**(wH ) = e2**(wH ) =
λwH −1
g +α .
 
 
(iii) The response to a change from wL  to wH : In this example, 
*
1 ( )Le w  exceeds 
** **
1 2( ) ( )H He w e w=  if ,H L Lgw w wg g
α α
λ
⎛ ⎤+∈ −⎜ ⎥⎝ ⎦ . Thus, changing the wage from  wL to  wH  may 
decrease effort per shift if the wage increase is not too high. Notice also that the effect crucially 
  
depends on  L0 , the value of leisure. If L0 = 0 , the effect cannot occur, because the wage cancels 
from the participation condition (A7). Then the individual always works the same number of 
shifts, irrespective of the wage, and effort responds positively to the wage, irrespective of the 
strength of the intertemporal spillover α . By continuity, this also holds for some  L0 > 0 . Thus, 
in our example intertemporal spillovers alone can produce the described response of shifts and 
effort to the wage only if the value of leisure is large enough.  
 
Appendix C 
 
In this appendix, we derive the conditions under which a loss averse individual whose 
preferences obey (7) in the text will reject lotteries A and B. For the purpose of lottery choices 
the disutility of effort does not matter so that we can simplify preferences to  
v(x − r) = λ x − r( ) if x ≥ rγλ x − r( ) if x < r
⎧⎨⎩  
where  x is the lottery outcome, and r is the reference point. We take the reference point to be the 
status quo. The individual will reject gamble A if 
0.5v(−5)+ 0.5v(8) ≤ v(0)  
which simplifies to  
0.5( 5 ) 0.5(8) 0γλ λ− + ≤  
This condition is satisfied if  
8
5
γ ≥ . 
The individual will  reject gamble B if 
1
64
v(−30)+ 6
64
v(−17) + 15
64
v(−4)+ 20
64
v(9) + 15
64
v(22)+ 6
64
v(35)+ 1
64
v(48) ≤ v(0) . 
Plugging in our functional form and simplifying, we find that the individual will reject the 
gamble if  
793
192
γ ≥  
As claimed in the text, the degree of loss aversion required to reject gamble B is greater than the 
degree of loss aversion needed to reject A.  
  
Appendix D 
In this appendix we prove the following: If an individual has a concave utility function u( ) and 
rejects a coin flip where she can either win CHF 8 or lose CHF 5 for all wealth levels [m,∞) , 
then she will reject any coin flip in which she could lose CHF 32 no matter how large the positive 
prize that is associated with the coin flip. 
Proof: We proceed in four steps 
(i) We adopt the convention that, if indifferent, the individual rejects the coin flip. Rejecting the 
coin flip implies 
0.5u(m + 8) + 0.5u(m − 5) ≤ u(m)
⇔ u(m + 8) − u(m) ≤ u(m) − u(m − 5) . 
It follows from concavity that 8 u(m + 8) − u(m + 7)[ ]≤ u(m + 8) − u(m)  and.  
Define MU(x) = u(x)− u(x −1) as the marginal utility of the xth dollar. Putting the last three 
inequalities together, we obtain 
MU(m + 8) ≤ 5
8
MU(m − 5)  (D1) 
and, because of the premise, it is true that MU(x +12) ≤ 5
8
MU(x) for all x > m - 4.  
(ii) We now derive an upper bound on u(∞) .  The concavity of u( ) implies 
u(m +12) ≤ u(m) +12MU(m) .  
Using the same logic,  
u(m + 24) ≤ u(m) +12MU(m) +12MU(m +12)
≤ u(m) +12MU(m) 1+ 5
8
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
u(m + 36) ≤ u(m) +12MU(m) 1+ 5
8
+ 5
8
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
 
and so on. Thus, we can develop a geometric series starting from m. Taking the limit, we obtain 
u(∞) ≤ u(m) +12MU 8
3
= u(m) + 32MU(m)  
(iii) Concavity implies u(m − 32) ≤ u(m) − 32MU(m) . 
(iv) Using the results from step (ii) and (iii), we get an upper bound on the value of a coin flip 
where the individual would either lose CHF 32 or win an infinite amount:  
  
0.5u(m − 32)+ 0.5u(∞) ≤ u(m)  
This implies that the individual would reject the gamble. This concludes the proof. 
 
 
  
 
Messengers, 
Flash
Group A Group B
3500.67 3269.94 1461.70 1637.49
(2703.25) (2330.41) (1231.95) (1838.61)
Mean Shifts 12.14 10.95 5.19 6.76
(8.06) (7.58) (4.45) (6.11)
N 21 19 21 59
4131.33 3005.75 844.21 1408.23
(2669.21) (2054.20) (1189.53) (1664.39)
Mean Shifts 14.00 9.85 3.14 6.32
(7.25) (6.76) (4.63) (6.21)
N 22 20 21 65
2734.03 3675.57 851.23 921.58
(2571.58) (2109.19) (1150.31) (1076.47)
Mean Shifts 8.73 12.55 3.29 4.46
(7.61) (7.49) (4.15) (4.74)
N 22 20 24 72
Notes a) Standard deviations in parenthesis
b) Group A received the high commission rate in  Experimental 
Period 1, group B in Experimental Period 2.
TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean 
Revenues
Four-Week 
Period Prior 
to Experiment
Treatment 
Period 1
Treatment 
Period 2
Participating Messengers Non-
Participating 
Messengers, 
Veloblitz
Mean 
Revenues
Mean 
Revenues
 
 
  
Messengers, 
Flash
Group A Group B
-48.88 -119.91 456.72 305.08
(366.61) (302.61) (179.92) (131.42)
71.03
(475.37)
721.98 -277.95 -160.77 102.85
(192.90) (240.62) (173.89) (105.76)
999.93
(308.40)
-675.32 391.87 -258.95 -342.84
(288.62) (250.55) (137.61) (129.50)
1067.19
(382.20)
Notes a) Standard error of the means in parenthesis
b) Same number of observations as in Table I
c) Group A received the high commission rate in  Experimental Period 
1, group B in Experimental Period 2.
Treatment 
Period 2
Difference: 
Group A - 
Group B
Difference: 
Group B - 
Group A
Mean 
Revenues
Treatment 
Period 1
TABLE II: REVENUES PER FOUR-WEEK PERIOD
AVERAGE DEVIATIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL MEANS
Difference: 
Group A - 
Group B
Participating Messengers Non-
Participating 
Messengers, 
Veloblitz
Mean 
Revenues
Mean 
RevenuesFour-Week 
Period Prior 
to Experiment
 
 
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Observations are 
restricted to
Messengers 
Participating 
in Experiment
All 
Messengers 
at Veloblitz
All 
Messengers 
at Flash and 
Veloblitz
All 
Messengers 
at Flash and 
Veloblitz
Messengers 
Participating 
in Experiment
All 
Messengers 
at Veloblitz
All 
Messengers 
at Flash and 
Veloblitz
All 
Messengers 
at Flash and 
Veloblitz
Treatment Dummy 1033.6*** 1094.5*** 1035.8** 1076.2*** 3.99*** 4.08*** 3.44** 3.9***
(326.9) (297.8) (444.7) (290.6) (1.030) (0.942) (1.610) (0.930)
Dummy for Non- -54.4 -0.772
treated at Veloblitz (407.4) (1.520)
Treatment Period 1 -211 -370.6 -264.8 -290 -1.28 -1.57 -0.74 -1.01
(497.3) (334.1) (239.9) (200.6) (1.720) (1.210) (0.996) (0.781)
Treatment Period 2 -574.7 -656.2 -650.5** -675.9** -2.56 -2.63** -2.19** -2.51**
(545.7) (357.9) (284.9) (238.0) (1.860) (1.260) (1.090) (0.859)
Individual Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.74 0.786 0.753 0.753 0.694 0.74 0.695 0.695
N 124 190 386 386 124 190 386 386
Notes: 
b) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Revenues per four-week period Dependent Variable: Shifts per four-week period
TABLE III: MAIN EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
OLS REGRESSIONS
a) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on messenger,  are in parentheses
 
  
 
Messengers, 
Flash
Group A Group B
0.22 -0.35 1.57 0.98
(1.29) (0.98) (0.75) (0.53)
0.57
(1.62)
2.53 -1.18 -0.48 0.52
(0.65) (0.79) (0.75) (0.42)
3.71
(1.02)
-2.74 1.52 -0.96 -1.27
(0.98) (0.77) (0.57) (0.45)
4.26
(1.24)
Notes a) Standard error of the means in parenthesis
b) Same number of observations as in Table I
c) Group A received the high commission rate in  Experimental 
Period 1, group B in Experimental Period 2.
Treatment 
Period 1
TABLE IV: SHIFTS PER FOUR-WEEK PERIOD
AVERAGE DEVIATIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL MEANS
Difference: 
Group A - 
Group B
Participating Messengers Non-
Participating 
Messengers, 
Veloblitz
Mean 
Revenues
Mean 
RevenuesFour-Week 
Period Prior to 
Experiment
Treatment 
Period 2
Difference: 
Group A - 
Group B
Difference: 
Group B - 
Group A
Mean 
Revenues
 
 
 
  
 
(1) (2)
Treatment Dummy -0.0642** -0.0601**
(0.030) (0.030)
Gender (female = 1) -0.0545
(0.052)
Log(tenure) 0.105*** 0.015
(0.016) (0.062)
Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes
R Squared 0.149 0.258
N 1137 1137
TABLE V: THE IMPACT OF THE EXPERIMENT 
ON LOG REVENUES PER SHIFT 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG(REVENUES PER 
SHIFT) DURING FIXED SHIFTS , OLS REGRESSIONS 
 
Notes: a) Observations are taken from group A and group B  
while working on fixed shifts.  
 b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on  
messenger, are in parentheses 
 c) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10  
percent level, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0374 -0.0273 -0.0353 -0.0369
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
-0.0983** -0.105** -0.0827*** -0.0755**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.032) (0.034)
Gender (female = 1) -0.0485 -0.0457
(0.052) (0.052)
Log(tenure) 0.104*** 0.00152 0.102*** -0.00131
(0.016) (0.061) (0.017) (0.061)
Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R Squared 0.14 0.243 0.14 0.243
N 1137 1137 1137 1137
Loss Aversion Measure 1 Loss Aversion Measure 2
TABLE VI: DOES LOSS AVERSION EXPLAIN THE REDUCTION IN 
EFFORT PER SHIFT?
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG(REVENUES PER SHIFT) DURING FIXED 
SHIFTS , OLS REGRESSIONS 
 
Treatment Effect×
not loss averse
 
Treatment Effect×
loss averse
 
Notes: a) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on messenger, are in parentheses. 
 b) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 c) Loss aversion measure 1 (denoted by L): L=1 if subject rejects lottery A, L=0 if 
subject accepts lottery A. 
 d) Loss aversion measure 2 (denoted by L'): L'=2 if subject rejects both lotteries, 
L'=1 if subject rejects one of the lotteries, L'=0 if subject accepts both lotteries.  
 
  
Figure 1: Revenue per four week period 
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(b) Deviations of Revenues from Individual 
Means
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Figure 2: Shifts per four week period 
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(b) Deviations of Shifts from Individual 
Means
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Figure 3: Log of Daily Revenues on Fixed Shifts 
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(b) Deviation of Log (Daily Revenues) from 
Individual Means of Log (Daily Revenues)
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Figure 4: The Behavior of Loss Averse and Not Loss Averse Subjects during Control 
and Treatment Period in Fixed Shifts 
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